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Can a Small nation be Competitive in the Global Sporting Arms Race? The Case of 
Denmark 
In 2014, the Danish elite sport organisation, Team Danmark, celebrated its 30th 
anniversary. Team Danmark was founded by the government in response to the 
country’s decline in international standings. This study examines how Denmark’s 
international performance has developed in the global sporting arms race since 
then. It analyses how a small nation can improve its international competitiveness 
despite stagnating funding and growing international competition. The paper 
argues that the establishment of Team Danmark in 1984 is a key factor behind 
Denmark’s success in elite sport. Measured in absolute terms, by a market share 
approach, and adjusted for differences in population, wealth, religion and 
relevant political factors, it is evident that Denmark is performing well and 
appears to be competitive. Denmark is now the leading nation in Scandinavia and 
is doing better than almost all other smaller countries in the Summer Olympic 
disciplines. By examining the development of Danish elite sport policies, the 
paper shows how the establishment of Team Danmark has created an elite sport 
structure that has helped Denmark to bounce back from its previous decline. 
Keywords: Summer Olympic Games, global sporting arms race, Team Danmark, 
elite sport systems, medal standings, SPLISS study.  
I. Introduction 
When the Danish elite sport organisation, Team Danmark (TD), was founded in 1984, 
Denmark’s performance in international tournaments such as the Summer Olympic 
Games
1
 was exceptionally poor. In the years leading up to 1984, Denmark enjoyed 
international success in very few sports. Its athletes’ performance at the Olympic Games 
in 1972 (Munich) and 1976 (Montreal), for instance, resulted in only one and three 
medals respectively. The nation had never before performed as badly. In 1980 
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 Denmark does not have a tradition for winter sports comparable to the other Nordic countries. This is 
due to climatic and topographical reasons. Thus, the following analysis focuses on summer sports 
only. 
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(Moscow) and 1984 (Los Angeles), the Danish athletes’ performances improved. 
However, with stronger nations not competing due to the US (1980) and Soviet Union 
(1984) boycotts, the Danish results did not demonstrate an increased international 
competitiveness in relative terms. 
The reasons for Denmark’s poor results over this period  can be summarised in 
one word: ‘amateurism’ (Nielsen & Storm, 2014). Compared to the athletes competing 
under the Soviet and Eastern European elite sport systems – such as the GDR’s – the 
Danish athletes had only sporadic support from sponsors, their parents and the few 
Danish sport federations that engaged seriously in elite sport (Danish Ministry of 
Culture, 1983a, 1983b). Taking a systematic approach to elite sport development, the 
Eastern Bloc fought to win this part of its Cold War with the West by investing huge 
amounts of resources into elite sport to demonstrate a broader (political) system of 
supremacy (D’Agati, 2013).  
At the 1976 Olympics (Montreal), more than a third (35 percent) of all medals 
available were won by the USSR and GDR, while the Eastern Bloc countries combined 
won more than half (51 percent). Their dominance continued until 1988 (Seoul), the last 
Olympics before the collapse of the communist regimes, when the Eastern Bloc came 
close to winning half of the total medals (48 percent). In Western countries the Eastern 
Bloc athletes were said to be ‘state amateurs’ (Nielsen & Storm, 2014). It was 
increasingly seen as imperative to implement appropriate measures to counteract the 
unequal terms of competition to catch up with their elite sport success. 
Australia led the way by establishing the Australian Institute of Sport in 1981 
(Böhlke & Robinson, 2009; Stewart, Nicholson, Smith, & Westerbeek, 2004) and other 
Western countries such as Western Germany, France, Norway and Switzerland also 
started new initiatives to support their athletes in order to create more equal competitive 
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conditions. In Denmark, the political climate gradually developed from opposition to 
support for the use of government  funds on elite sport (Hansen, 2012). This led to the 
establishment of Team Danmark in 1984 – a government-funded and regulated 
organisation in charge of improving Denmark’s sporting performance. Now more than 
30 years have passed. How has Team Danmark coped with the problems that instigated 
its foundation? Is Danish elite sport better off today than it was 30 years ago in terms of 
its international standings? 
This contribution aims to answer these questions by examining the Danish elite 
sport system in terms of the international standing of Danish elite sports. The paper adds 
to existing research on international elite sport success by evaluating the performance of 
a small – yet wealthy – country in the global sporting arms race. By means of a case 
study, it aims to assess whether a small nation can be competitive in an increasingly 
competitive international sporting environment. From a broader perspective, the study 
can provide insights into what small nations can do to become more competitive in an 
international sporting context. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section II provides a literature review of 
contemporary approaches to research in international elite sport and the factors deemed 
crucial to achieving success. Section III applies measures of performance to evaluate the 
development of Danish elite sport’s international standing. In Section IV, the 
characteristics of the Danish elite sport model are examined to determine the link 
between the country’s sporting success and Team Danmark’s developmental role. The 
concluding Section V reflects on the implications of the study’s core findings and future 
(research) perspectives. 
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II. Literature review 
Research in international elite sport has grown significantly over the years (Böhlke & 
Robinson, 2009). Besides various econometric papers on medal standings and 
prediction models – usually produced prior to the Olympics2 – policy researchers have 
started to dig deeper into the factors that are critical to achieving international sporting 
success. With regard to the Nordic countries, Augestad and Bergsgard (2007), Storm 
(2008), Bergsgard and Norberg (2010), and Andersen and Rongland (2012) are some of 
the most recent attempts to understand Scandinavia’s elite sport policies, funding 
streams and the desire for international sporting success. These studies tend to take a 
comparative approach to identify similarities and differences among the Nordic nations. 
Looking beyond the Scandinavian context, similar research has been conducted 
by Stewart et al. (2004), Green and Houlihan (2005), Houlihan and Green (2008), and 
Green (2009) on nations such as China, Japan, France, Poland, New Zealand, US, 
Germany, Australia, United Kingdom, and Canada. Their overall conclusions are that 
there is an increasing convergence of elite sport systems (Shibli, Bingham, & Henry, 
2007). Due to internationalisation and globalisation, nations have adopted similar elite 
sports systems and policies aimed at improving performance, thereby institutionalising a 
broad elite sport system template that only varies slightly between nations. However, 
studies by Böhlke and Robinson (2009), Andersen and Rongland (2012) and De 
Bosscher et al. (2015) conclude that despite this convergence, there are still significant 
differences between nations. 
Other studies look deeper into the primary determinants of success in 
international elite sports (De Bosscher et al., 2015; Digel, Burk, & Fahrner, 2006; Green 
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 According to Andreff and Andreff (2014), around 30 studies elaborated on medal prediction models for 
the Summer Olympics from the 1970s onward.   
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& Oakley, 2001), identifying a range of factors that are critical to sporting success. 
Some nations believe that specialising in a narrower set of sports will help them stay 
competitive in overall standings and recently some studies have focused on the 
determinants of success in specific sports. Examples include Sotiriadou, Gowthorp and 
De Bosscher (2014); Truyens, De Bosscher, Heyndels, and Westerbeek (2014); and 
Böhlke (2007) who focus on canoe sprint, athletics and cross-country skiing, 
respectively. 
A core theoretical approach has evolved from the research outlined above. 
Drawing on and synthesising existing research, De Bosscher, De Knop, Van 
Bottenburg, and Shibli (2006); De Bosscher (2007); De Bosscher, Bingham, Shibli, 
Von Bottenburg, and De Knop (2008); De Bosscher, De Knop, and Van Bottenburg 
(2009); and De Bosscher, Shibli, Westerbeek and Van Bottenburg (2015) have 
developed one of the most comprehensive frameworks for analysing the 
competitiveness of nations in international elite sport: the SPLISS
3
 model. The 
framework is based on the notion that the formula for international elite sport success 
can be divided into various determinants located on the micro, meso and macro levels. 
Determinants at the macro level, such as population, wealth, landmass, and 
political or religious system characteristics, are shown to explain around 50 percent of 
the differences in nations’ international sporting successes (De Bosscher, 2007; De 
Bosscher et al., 2015). The determinants at the meso and micro levels such as national 
sport policies and the individual athletes’ personal characteristics and immediate 
environment(s) contribute to explaining the differences that cannot be explained by 
macro level factors (De Bosscher, 2007).  
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 SPLISS: ‘Sport Policy Factors Leading to International Sporting Success’. 
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The macro level determinants are difficult to control, especially in the short 
term. Changes in GDP or population size are long term determinants, whereas elite 
sport policies and the athletes’ micro level environments can change more quickly (De 
Bosscher, 2007). The SPLISS 1.0 (De Bosscher et al., 2008) and 2.0 studies (De 
Bosscher et al., 2015), of which Denmark participated in 2.0
4
, identify nine critical 
factors at the meso level. The 1.0 study evaluates these meso level factors for four 
nations. The 2.0 study increases the number of nations to 15 and uses the study’s data to 
identify the most important factors for an efficient elite sport system. These include 
financial support (i.e. direct financial support for the national elite sport system), 
organisational structure, and scientific research. Other important factors are talent 
identification, talent development, training facilities, provision and development of 
coaches, and (access to) (inter)national competition. Factors such as (a high level of) 
sport participation, and athletic and post-career support are less important (De Bosscher 
et al., 2015). Overall, SPLISS 1.0 and 2.0 provide a useful mechanism to evaluate 
national elite sport policies. 
In the following section of this paper, we will evaluate the Danish elite sport 
model following this theoretical approach. We use the following model – illustrated in 
Figure 1 – inspired by the SPLISS-study as our line of progression.  
 
…Insert Figure 1 here… 
 
Starting from the output side (i.e. the results gained – by competing nations – in 
international sporting competition), our aim is to illustrate how international success in 
sport can be measured and how it is possible to approach the question of what 
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 The Danish results from the SPLISS 2.0 study can be found in Storm and Jørgensen (2014). 
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constitutes a successful elite sport system. From there we move on to evaluate the 
Danish elite sport system in more detail by looking at its input and throughput. We use 
new data as well as results from previous research (see below) such as the SPLISS 2.0 
study (De Bosscher et al., 2015; Storm & Tofft-Jørgensen, 2014) to fulfill this task. 
III: The development of Denmark’s international standings: 
output
5
 
The international literature on elite sport performance offers a range of methods to 
measure international sporting success on the output side. Here we apply, discuss and 
develop those that are most suitable for measuring a small nation’s standings in order to 
analyse Denmark’s performance development.  
The most frequently used way of measuring international elite sport success is to 
look at the medal table from the Olympic Games. Another is the total number of medals 
in international tournaments. Figure 2 shows the total number of Danish medals won 
from 1975-2015. 
 
…Insert Figure 2 here… 
 
The figure displays a significant and steady improvement in Danish elite sport results 
since the establishment of Team Danmark in 1984. From a total of 40-50 medals in the 
1980s, the number of medals has increased markedly in the years leading up to 2015 
and in recent years the total number has been 115-125 medals.  
However, these numbers are not a valid measure of Denmark’s competitiveness 
in elite sport. First, there has been an increase in the number of international elite sport 
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 Parts of the following two sections build upon Nielsen and Storm (2014), and Storm and Nielsen (2013). 
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tournaments. Consequently, an increased medal tally does not necessarily reflect real 
improvement in the Danish standings, but is rather an effect of the larger number of 
medals on offer. Second, some disciplines can be considered ‘soft’ in the sense that the 
standard of international competition is low. If the increase in the number of medals is 
mainly in such ‘soft’ disciplines, it does not indicate improved performance (Storm, 
2008). 
Olympic disciplines are the most prestigious and difficult to win (Balmer, 
Nevill, & Williams, 2003). Focusing on these disciplines is a way of overcoming the  
problem of measuring international competitiveness (Storm & Nielsen, 2013). The 
Olympic medal count is a significant and relatively unambiguous measure of Denmark's 
performance in international elite sport. However, it is very sensitive to marginal or 
random variances in performance. For a small nation like Denmark, a few fourth places 
instead of bronze medals can have a strong impact on its medal tally. Therefore, rather 
than looking only at the top three results in these events, it is appropriate to consider 
positions outside of the medals as well (Shibli et al., 2007; Storm, Nielsen, & Thomsen, 
2016). 
Table 1 shows the development of the top 25 nations measured by allocating 
points to the countries that finished in the top eight in Olympic disciplines from 1988 to 
2015. The results are weighted by awarding gold medals eight points, silver medals 
seven points and so on ending with one point for an eighth place. Whereas the ranking 
of no. 1-8 is unambiguous in most Olympic disciplines, it is not so in others.
6
  
 
…Insert Table 1 here… 
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 For instance, in some sports (e.g. badminton, boxing and tennis) it is impossible to rank quarterfinalists 
and all are ranked no. 5 in this study. Further, in other sports (judo and taekwondo and wrestling) 
the ranking of no. 5-8 is ambiguous because of the repechage system. In this study, losers of bronze 
medal matches are ranked no. 5 and losers of the preceding repechage round ranked no. 7.  
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In addition to the Olympic years, the table includes top eight points in the years between 
the Beijing and London Games (2009, 2010, and 2011) and the years between the 
London and the Rio Games (2013, 2014, and 2015). In these years, results in world 
championships and similar competitions or world rankings in disciplines that are part of 
the upcoming Summer Olympics are included. This is not a straight-forward exercise. 
The approach takes into account the conditions of participation at the Olympics. In 
disciplines with only one participant per nation, only the highest ranked athlete per 
nation in the respective discipline is included in the calculation of the ‘simulated’ 
Olympic results in that specific year. This result, for example, in a fourth place counted 
as a third place, such as happened with Jonas Høgh Christensen's fourth place at the 
World Championships in Finn dinghy in 2011, when two British competitors placed in 
front of him.  
The approach also takes into account that, in some cases, athletes compete for 
bronze medals at the Olympics, whereas this is not necessarily the case at World 
Championships. In such cases, only the bronze medalist at the World Championship, 
which was the highest ranked in the discipline’s official world rankings at the time the 
World Cup was held, is included in the calculation. In some instances, there are no 
unambiguous way of finding no. 1-8 in Olympic disciplines in years in-between the 
Olympic Games and some discretionary judgment has to be applied.
7
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 For instance, in football there is no competition with eligibility criteria similar to the Olympic 
competition in-between the Olympic Games. In this study, the results from the FIFA U-20 World 
Cup are included in uneven years and the results from the World Cup in even years. Another 
example is tennis, where ATP/WTA double rankings cannot be used directly because they include 
double pairs with the players of different nationality, which is not permitted in the Olympics. In this 
study, the ranking of no. 1-8 is based on a simple addition of double points for the two best players 
per nation. In athletics, rankings based on season best results are used. This has the effect that in 
years with no IAAF World Championships the standing of Kenya is boosted because its distance 
runners consistently do much better in terms of best times than in actual competitions in 
championships. In this study, no attempt has been made to correct for this effect.  
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The inclusion of the years in between the Olympic years gives a more balanced 
view of the development of Denmark’s – and other small nations’ – standings and adds 
to existing performance measurement methodologies by offering a year-by-year 
approach to Olympic success by means of allocating top eight points. 
The results of this approach reveal a significant improvement for Denmark over 
the long term, although with some fluctuations. The total sum of top eight points for 
Denmark in the Olympic Games decreased significantly from Atlanta to Beijing (1996: 
108; 2000: 92; 2004: 98; 2008: 85). However, from 2009 onward, the Danish results 
started to soar. The 2012 London Games represents a breakthrough and Denmark has 
achieved even better results since then.  
Market share: Adjusting for the increase in medal events 
As mentioned above, the number of international elite events has increased over the 
years and the same is true for Olympic events. In 1984, the Olympics consisted of 221 
events, whereas the 2012 London Olympics had 302 medal events. Calculating market 
share adjusts for the fact that an increase in the number of events in itself could lead to 
an increase in medals or top eight points (De Bosscher, 2007; Shibli & Bingham, 2008; 
Shibli et al., 2007; UK Sport, 2003). 
However, this is not the case for Denmark. Table 2 displays the development in 
its market share of top eight points from 1988 to 2015. In accordance with Figure 1 and 
Table 1, the market share table (Table 2) shows an increase in Denmark’s international 
standings. After the Atlanta Olympics (1996), the Danish results declined towards 
Beijing (2008), but soared to a higher level than any previous year between 2009 and 
2015. 
 
…Insert Table 2 here… 
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Regression analysis: A relative measure of performance  
The analysis based on absolute and market share developments in medals and top eight 
points shows a clear improvement in Denmark’s standings since the foundation of Team 
Danmark. However, is Denmark’s elite sport performance as good as one could expect 
taking into account its wealth, population, political system and other relevant macro 
factors? Below, we will aim to measure Denmark’s results by correcting for macro 
variables that undoubtedly have an influence on international elite sport competitiveness 
(De Bosscher, 2007; De Bosscher et al., 2015). 
We do this by using a standard OLS regression model, which serves two 
interconnected purposes. First, it helps us to identify the macro level determinants of 
international sporting success. Second, based on an analysis of the regression results, we 
can divide the observed nations in two groups – nations that punch above their weight 
and nations that underperform – taking their respective resources into account (De 
Bosscher, 2007; De Bosscher et al., 2015). This allows us to determine how efficient 
Denmark is in relation to its macro level platform, and, in turn, better assess how the 
Danish elite sport system functions.  
Following such an approach, De Bosscher et al. (2015) argue that nations which 
perform better than expected can be considered as having well-functioning elite sport 
systems. On the other hand, nations performing below their expected score indicate 
weak elite sport policies or – perhaps – no policies or elite sport system at all. 
Model and variables 
As a dependent variable for our model of relative performance, we use top eight points 
and deploy a number of independent variables in order to see which ones influence 
success. The independent variables, POP (β1) and GDP pr. cap (β2) are usually used in 
12 
 
performance analyses like this. Previous studies have found that population size and 
wealth (measured by GDP) have significant influence on international sporting success 
(e.g. Andreff & Andreff, 2010; Bernard & Busse, 2004; Johnson & Ali, 2004; Kuper & 
Sterken, 2012). The model tests whether our data are able to confirm such correlations. 
Density (β3) is deployed to test whether variances in population density (pop/area) 
influence performance. The decision to include this variable is inspired by De Bosscher 
(2007), who argues that high levels of population density can have a positive impact on 
the efficiency of elite sport systems because training facilities usually are closer to each 
other in densely populated nations. This (hypothetically) reduces travelling distances to 
training facilities for athletes and thus output performance because it gives athletes 
more time to train. 
In addition, we include three dummy variables to adjust the figures according to 
religious and political factors affecting performance. As pointed out in the introduction, 
countries in the Eastern Bloc invested intensively in elite sport. We test whether this 
still influences their performance and also if the ‘one party state tradition’ affects the 
performance of contemporary communist nations by entering a dummy variable for 
former Eastern Bloc nations (β5)
8
 and a dummy variable for current communist 
nations (β6).  
Furthermore, a Muslim dummy (β4) is deployed into the model, also inspired by 
De Bosscher (2007), to adjust for the fact that female elite athletes are more or less 
absent in Muslim countries and are therefore not usually in contention for medals or top 
eight results. Based on this, our initial model used for measuring relative performance is 
expressed as:  
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 New former Yugoslavian nations are part of the variable. Albania is included as well. 
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ln 𝑇𝑜𝑝8 =
𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln 𝑃𝑂𝑃 + 𝛽2 ln 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑟. 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 + 𝛽3 ln 𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑢𝑠𝑙𝑖𝑚 +
𝛽5 𝐸𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛 𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜖, where β0 & 𝜖 represents the equation’s 
constant and error term respectively. 
 
…Insert Table 3 here… 
 
The regression results based on data for 2012 (London, N=110
9
) reveals that all 
variables are significant except Density (β3) and Communist (β6). These variables are 
withdrawn from the model. The final model has an R
2
 value of 0.581, i.e. 58.1 percent 
of the variation in output (the dependent variable) can be explained by the variations in 
the significant explanatory (independent) variables. This is quite a good model 
compared to the ones used in previous studies (se for example De Bosscher et al. 
(2015)), which has had R
2
 values of around 0.50.
10
 Regression results for our final 2012 
model are displayed in Table 4.
11
 
 
…Insert Table 4 here… 
 
To assess the efficiency of the included nations’ elite sport systems, residual values 
(which represent over-/underperformance) are calculated by subtracting the observed 
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 N=110 refers to the fact that of the 204 nations taking part in London 2012, 110 achieved a top 8 place. 
10
 De Bosscher et al. (2015) present three models with different dependent variables. It should be noted, 
that only one of the models were based on top 8 placings. This is the model we refer to here in 
terms of R
2
 value comparisons. 
11
 No outliers +/- 3 standard deviations away from the mean were found regarding the final model. A 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test showed that the error term for the final regression model is normally 
distributed (sign=0.200). This is further confirmed by a Shapiro-Wilk test for normality 
(sign=0.626). Furthermore, visual inspections of scatterplots did not reveal any problems with the 
aptness of the data. Unacceptable correlations between the independent variables were not found 
either (i.e. no problems of multicollinearity (VIF<10)).  
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performance from the calculated expected performance modelled from the regression 
(De Bosscher, 2007; De Bosscher et al., 2015).  
In Table 5, a ranking based on residuals is made for 2012 and 2015 using the 
same regression model variables for both years, but using data for 2012 and 2015 
respectively.
12
 Positive residual values indicate a better performance than expected 
taking the independent variables in to account and vice versa. The table shows that a 
different picture of nations’ performance than the rankings based on absolute top eight 
points and market share emerges when socio-economic, political and religious factors 
are taken into account. 
 
…Insert Table 5 here… 
 
This relative ranking indicates that the top-ranked nations have found an efficient way 
of using their resources to achieve international success in elite sport. However, there 
may be other factors behind their success (De Bosscher et al., 2015), such as 
specialisation. Some of the top-ranked nations in Table 5 are sporting monocultures in 
the sense that they are competitive only in a few sports in which they have a strong 
tradition and/or competitive advantage. All three of the top-ranked nations in 2012 
(Jamaica, Kenya and Ethiopia) are extremely specialised, being competitive in a few 
running disciplines only. This also applies to Mongolia, which is only competitive in 
judo and wrestling. The high ranking of other nations with very small populations, such 
as Grenada and Samoa, does not show anything about their elite sport systems as their 
ranking reflects only one medal or top eight placing. Ignoring sporting monocultures 
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 Tests for aptness of data (please see the appendix) in the 2015 regression model also reveal that the 
model lays within acceptable tests scores. 
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and micro nations, the table indicates that based on the results in 2012 and 2015 the 
following countries appear to have the most efficient elite sport systems: New Zealand, 
Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands and Denmark.     
Denmark’s residual values are positive and the country’s ranking is better than 
measured in absolute terms or by market share. To analyse the Danish elite sport 
model’s development and efficiency over time, we ran regressions and calculated 
residuals for all data available from 1988 to 2015 based on the approach above.
13
 Table 
6 shows that Denmark’s relative performance improves over time. From 2009 onward, 
its residual values increased compared to the earlier periods. 
 
…Insert Table 6 here… 
 
Based on the above results, we will now evaluate the development of the Danish elite 
sports model in more detail to see whether its improved performance (output) can be 
linked to its resources (input) and elite sport policies (throughputs). 
IV. Danish elite sport policies: in- and throughputs  
Danish Inputs 
Danish elite sport’s total financial input is difficult to estimate because reliable data 
representing indirect input to Team Danmark from sources other than private 
sponsorships and public funding is absent. As pointed out by Ibsen et al. (2010), reliable 
data on the cost of elite sport in municipalities, local voluntary sports clubs and cost 
associated with professional elite sport does not exist. 
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 We used the same model - dependent and independent variables - for each year, but used data for the 
specific year in question for each regression. Detailed regression results are displayed in the 
appendix (Table A1 and A2). For robustness, each year’s models have been checked for aptness of 
data - as was the case in the 2012 model described in the text.  
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Concerning direct (state level) input, the development of Team Danmark’s total 
revenues and expenditure on elite sport from 1985-2015 is displayed in Figure 3. The 
data is taken from Team Danmark’s annual reports and are displayed in 2015 prices.  
 
---- Insert Figure 3 here ---- 
 
Regardless of whether it is measured as total revenue or total expenditure 
(spending by Team Danmark on elite sport), there is a marked increase in input between 
1985 and 1993. This is mainly due to a general increase in profits from national lotteries 
over the same period. However, from 1994 onward, total inputs from Team Danmark 
show a small decline. This has happened in spite of new private sources of funding in 
recent years. A private fund has granted 55m DKK in support in the last Olympic cycle. 
This has compensated for a reduction in governmental support. In addition to the 
(funding) input to the elite sport system from Team Danmark, input from the sport 
federations needs to be added to give a complete picture of the total direct costs 
associated with Danish elite sport. A report from the Danish consultancy firm KPMG in 
2002 (KPMG Consulting, 2002) estimated that, on average, the supported federations 
added 100 percent to the input provided by Team Danmark. However, it is not clear 
how the federations’ inputs associated with elite sport have developed over time. 
Without objective measures, we assume that Danish elite sport’s total (financial) 
input varies – more or less – in accordance with the overall financial input provided by 
Team Danmark (but with a higher total than displayed). If this assumption is correct, the 
development over the whole period examined indicates that the Danish system has 
become more efficient.  
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The first years of Team Danmark’s existence involved an increase in funding 
and improved output in the late 1980s and early 1990s. From 1996, which represents a 
temporary peak measured by top eight points and market share, Denmark’s standing 
was threatened by increased international competition (Storm et al., 2016) and a decline 
in performance at the 2000 (Sydney), 2004 (Athens) and 2008 (Beijing) Olympics. 
These declines happened in spite of the fact that in this period (2000-2008), Team 
Danmark provided the highest level of funding seen in relation to the rest of the 
examined period.  
However, from 2009 onward, Denmark’s output (performance) increased 
despite a small decrease in Team Danmark’s input, thus indicating an improved system 
effect. A calculation of the annual cost (Team Danmark expenditure) per top-8 point – 
displayed in Figure 4 – shows a significant improvement from 1.7m DKK in 2000-2004 
to 1.1m DKK in recent years.  
 
---- Insert Figure 4 here ---- 
 
This is not a perfect indicator because there is a time lag between expenditure and 
effect. However, the figures indicates increased efficiency and higher return on 
investment. The question of efficiency, and the general functioning of the Danish elite 
sport system, will be dealt with in more detail below where the focus is on throughputs. 
Throughputs 
There is a lack of detailed research on the Danish elite sport system during the first 15 
years of Team Danmark operation. However, it can be argued that the 
professionalisation Team Danmark’s establishment (in itself) represented, helped to 
build a platform from where further improvements of the Danish system could be 
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achieved. In the late 1980s, Team Danmark started to construct its governance 
structures and relationships with federations and other relevant stakeholders. It 
developed a system of support, distributing funds to the federations and athletes 
(Kulturministeriet, 2001). Furthermore, it started to engage in talent development and 
provided a set of technical, physical, medical, psychological and dietary support 
facilities. It also provided specialised training facilities, supported the recruitment of top 
coaches and engaged in research and development activities (Kulturministeriet, 2001). 
It also introduced (post) athletic career support programs  (Nielsen, Nielsen, 
Christensen, & Storm, 2002). 
In 2001, the Danish Ministry of Culture initiated an evaluation of Team 
Danmark in connection with a revision of the Danish parliamentary Act on Elite Sport 
(Kulturministeriet, 2001). The overall conclusion was that Team Danmark had helped to 
establish a well-functioning elite sport system. Nevertheless, there were still concerns 
about the system due to the unrealised potential of municipal involvement and the lack 
of commercial sponsorship revenue in Danish elite sport.  
The process prompted some minor revisions of the Danish Act on Elite Sport 
aimed at improving the areas identified as concerns, and a sharper (political) focus on 
output. The report concluded that the (public) financial resources allocated to Team 
Danmark would be more or less on the same level in the coming years. At the same 
time, however, it expressed a political ambition for improved output performance. As a 
result, Team Danmark assumed a greater organisational focus on medals by copying a 
New Public Management approach – cutting the number of supported disciplines and 
allocating its resources to fewer sports. The approach was inspired by nations such as 
Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand in the anticipation of a positive effect on 
international competitiveness (Storm, 2012). 
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Team Danmark’s adoption of a more market-based ‘investment’-oriented 
support regime led to a heated debate in Denmark in the mid-2000s. It was criticized for 
compromising traditional Danish values of equality and fairness and for undermining 
the future potential in a range of non-supported sports. This was probably the most 
important change of elite sport policy in the last decade, and Team Danmark’s more 
selective approach to support of federations may be one of the main reasons why 
Denmark’s international standing has improved significantly over the last six to seven 
years. However, the focus on a smaller set of supported disciplines does not seem to 
have narrowed down the range of sports in which Denmark is successful, as had been 
feared by the federations that were excluded from support in the process.
14
 
In 2008, Storm (2008) conducted a research based evaluation of the Danish elite 
sport system and Team Danmark. It concluded that the Danish elite sport system 
performed well in relation to several of the factors evaluated: organisation and structure, 
sports medicine and support services, corporation with federations, and (post) athletic 
career support. Talent identification and development were among the areas in which 
the Danish system was in need of improving. Furthermore, Team Danmark needed less 
bureaucratic control procedures. Denmark’s training facilities were also lagging behind 
international standards. 
The SPLISS 2.0 study (De Bosscher et al., 2015) makes similar conclusions. It 
paints a picture of an efficient Danish elite sport system overall, which, compared to the 
nations analysed, achieves above average scores for a majority of the policy factors 
evaluated, including ‘structure and organisation’, ‘overall sport participation’, ‘talent 
                                                 
14
 It is important to stress that existing research is inconclusive as to whether allocating resources to a 
narrower set of disciplines is necessary to improve international standings. Even though a 
prioritised approach seems necessary to obtain a high level of international elite sport success, De 
Bosscher et al. (2015) conclude that it is the absolute amount of resources poured into the elite sport 
system that seems to matter the most in relation to output.      
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identification and talent development’, ‘(post) athletic career support’, and 
‘international competition’. Policy factors in which Denmark scored below the average 
were ‘financial support’, ‘training facilities’, ‘coach development and provision’, and 
‘research and innovation’ (De Bosscher et al., 2015).  
In 2013, following up on the national SPLISS results, Team Danmark adjusted 
its guidelines for financial support, along with its overall policy goals, in order to 
improve in relation to the national SPLISS report’s findings (Storm & Tofft-Jørgensen, 
2013), and the preliminary findings of the international comparisons. In 2013-2015, 
Danish researchers conducted annual surveys and qualitative interviews among 
performance directors, coaches, managers and athletes in the supported federations on 
behalf of Team Danmark (Storm, Rask, & Holskov, 2015). The results indicate a high 
level of satisfaction with the Danish elite sport system among all groups of respondents. 
Among the main concerns, however, was a question of the level of the overall funding 
for Danish elite sport, and problems concerning the provision of access to international 
training facilities, which were also identified in the SPLISS study.  
From an overall perspective, much evidence indicates that the system is largely 
efficient. Team Danmark seems to have gradually improved its procedures with regard 
to several of the critical throughputs. Although the evidence does not make proof of 
causality possible, we find it highly likely that it is the improvement of throughputs that 
have converted a relatively stable level of input into a higher output. In the next section, 
we briefly discuss the above findings and touch on the challenges that will face Danish 
elite sport in the years to come. 
V. Discussion, concluding remarks and future perspectives 
The analysis reveals that whatever measure is used - in absolute terms, by a market 
share approach, or adjusted for socio-economic, political and religious factors - 
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Denmark’s performance (output) in elite sport has improved over the years. The system 
appears to have become more efficient after the slump in the 1970s, when the country 
fell behind in the international sporting arms race. Denmark has even made a marked 
improvement in recent years, particularly between 2009 and 2015.  
It is arguable that the overall improvement would not have materialised without 
a well-organised elite sport system, and it seems that the establishment of Team 
Danmark has had a positive effect on Denmark’s standing in international elite sport by 
developing and improving this system. The Danish system has demonstrated the 
capability to convert input into output through systematic improvement of the 
throughputs. Denmark has improved its competitiveness in the global sporting arms 
race by continuously improving the system and focusing its resources on selected 
sports. Interestingly, this has happened in spite of stagnating funding (input) for Team 
Danmark. This further indicates an improved throughput process, where a higher output 
has been achieved for a relatively fixed amount of input. Seen from a broader 
perspective, the Danish case shows how a small nation, despite limited resources, can 
be successful in international elite sport. By fine-tuning the throughput procedures and 
focusing more on output, the Danish system has helped constantly improve Danish 
competitiveness in international elite sport. This clearly shows that a well-functioning 
elite sport system can help small nations to become successful.  
However, future success is far from guaranteed. The improvement of Denmark’s 
international standing in recent years in spite of stagnating funds contradicts the general 
trend that the total amount of funding is the most important prerequisite for international 
sporting success (De Bosscher et al., 2015). It will be very difficult to continue to do so. 
International competition and the investment and efforts required to stay competitive are 
increasing as reflected in the immense value accorded to medals in major sporting 
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events (De Bosscher et al., 2015; Shibli et al., 2007). Further, successful models are 
copied and results in decreasing returns
15
, unless they adapt to the increasingly 
competitive international environment and constantly improves. To counter the ongoing 
pressure of international competition and uphold its current standing, Team Danmark 
can do two things.  
First, it can work to improve its efficacy in the areas in which its performance is 
relatively poor. According to the SPLISS 2.0 study these are: research and innovation, 
training facilities, and coach provision and development (De Bosscher et al., 2015). 
Team Danmark has already put more focus on these factors by planning for a new 
national elite sports center. The idea is to improve the overall standard of training 
facilities by providing more specialised facilities for the supported sports. Furthermore, 
Team Danmark aims at making better room for researchers in the new facilities. This 
could potentially make way for more cooperation between athletes and researchers and 
more innovation. In addition, improved conditions for coaches would potentially affect 
the Danish output positively. One central finding in the Danish part of the SPLISS 2.0 
study were that, working as a coach - even at the highest level - is hard because 
employment is short term and uncertain. This makes many coaches leave sport in order 
to find better employment opportunities outside the sector. Future research can examine 
how and to what extent Team Danmark is able to improve the Danish elite sport system 
in these areas.  
Second, Team Danmark can work on increasing its revenue. The political 
priorities regarding sport in Denmark are mainly in favour of enhancing mass 
participation, and despite a generally positive attitude towards Team Danmark among 
                                                 
15
 Australia has painfully experienced this effect by way of a consistent decline since its high point at the 
Sydney Olympics in 2000 as other countries has copied its successful structure. 
23 
 
Danish politicians, a significant increase in public elite sport spending is unlikely in the 
near future. If Team Danmark is committed to improving its performance, new sources 
of revenue must be found by way of private sponsorships.  
The current ratio of Team Danmark’s public and private revenue is around 
80/20. This is a skewed distribution compared to similar organisations in other 
countries, and after 30 years of climbing up the ladder in international elite sport, 
primarily with public support, it seems clear that the next step for Danish elite sport 
could be to balance its sources of funding. This problem was identified in 2001 by the 
working group revising the Danish law on elite sport (Kulturministeriet, 2001). 
Although some progress has been made with respect to private sponsorships in recent 
years, this issue has not yet been dealt with in a systematic way.     
Besides improving the low scoring factors of the Danish system’s throughput, 
increasing the private sponsorship portfolio might be where Denmark has the greatest 
potential to uphold – and maybe even increase – its competitiveness in the coming 
years. 
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